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Introduction 
 
At the time of writing this thesis, it has been over a decade since the global financial 
crisis turned into a euro crisis. In the early 2020, a new crisis, caused by COVID-19 
pandemic, is hitting the eurozone. The survival of the euro seems more uncertain 
than ever before. There are different explanations for the root causes of the eurozone 
problems: several academics view the euro as a gigantic historic mistake, whereas 
others argue that there is nothing crisis-prone in the nature of the euro. Despite the 
different views, there seems to be a consensus regarding the fact that the euro has 
failed in terms of the main objectives of the common currency, namely bringing 
prosperity and stability through economic integration and accelerating political 
integration. Quite the contrary, it has worsened the standards of living and created 
instability and deep political fragmentation across Europe. 
 
This thesis aims at developing plausible visions of future for the eurozone, based on 
a literature review and scenario methodology. The research question of the thesis is 
the following. Utilizing scenario methodology, what kind of plausible futures can be 
envisioned for the eurozone? Is there a viable future for the EMU or is it doomed to 
fail due to its alleged flaws? What are the conditions in which the eurozone can 
prosper and the euro to become a well-functioning common currency? The 
hypothesis is that the future of the eurozone is extremely uncertain without 
significant social and fiscal reforms. 
 
To tackle the research question, I will look at various theories of the problems of the 
euro and proposals for fixing the flaws. I will focus on three schools of thought 
within the field of macroeconomics: neoclassical, neo-Keynesian and ordoliberal 
theories. The scenario-building exercise aims at demonstrating how these different 
theories may play out in practice. Each scenario reflects certain school of thought 
that entails specific elements of reform and governing principles for the EMU. 
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The thesis utilizes scenario methodology as it is particularly suitable for examining 
uncertain contexts. The scenarios are based on a literature review, that is further 
analyzed from the author’s perspective and developed into plausible scenarios for the 
future. It is argued that scenario methodology is a fruitful way to conceptualize 
uncertain future and potential shocks and turbulences it may hold, while producing 
novel academic insights. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 discusses the historical background of 
the EMU and the dynamics of the euro crisis of early 2010s. Chapter 2 develops 
theoretical framework of the study based on different theories of the EMU’s 
problems and flaws. Chapter 3 explains the scenario method and key variables of the 
scenarios. In chapter 4, the scenarios for the future of the euro are presented. Chapter 
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1 Historical background 
 
 
This chapter discusses historical background of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). First, the chapter looks at the founding process of the euro. 
The creation of the euro is of great importance, as many academics argue that the 
euro’s inherent defects were coined as the euro itself was coined. On the other hand, 
several analysts disagree with the view that the problems of the euro are design flaws 
by nature. Either way, the historical background plays important role in 
understanding the future possibilities. Second, the chapter explores the dynamics of 
the European debt crisis that started in 2010, after which the new crisis, caused by 
COVID-19 pandemic, is discussed briefly.  
 
1.1 Creation of the euro 
 
Planning of the common European currency began in the late 1980s. The 
groundwork for the euro was laid out in the Werner Report (1970), which proposed a 
gradual plan for stabilizing the exchange rates in Europe with the goal of adopting a 
single currency. In 1989, the Delors Report set out concrete guidelines for the 
creation of the Economic and Monetary Union. The report emphasized the numerous 
advantages of a single currency: it would remove currency exchange costs and 
exchange risks while facilitating the movement of people and trade which would 
eventually boost investment and economic growth. (Gabel, 2019.) 
 
In December 1991, European leaders gathered in Maastricht to create the rules for 
the European Economic and Monetary Union. The treaty introduced a concrete 
timeline to adopt the new currency. It also established convergence criteria for 
countries willing to apply the membership. Conditions included a requirement of 
annual budget deficits below 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), public debt 
ceiling of 60 percent of GDP, inflation rates not exceeding 1.5 percent of the 3 
lowest inflation rates in the EU, and stable exchange rates. (Gabel, 2019.) It is worth 
noting that the convergence criteria is highly criticized by several academics, e.g. 
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Stiglitz argues that the fiscal conditions aiming at convergence became a major cause 
for the eurozone divergence. (Stiglitz, 2017: 15.)  
 
Germany and France were the pivotal actors in the Maastricht process. The Germans 
and Dutch wanted to establish binding fiscal rules and sanctions for those who break 
the rules. According to several academics, the ceilings on debt and deficit were 
arbitrarily determined. Interestingly, the numbers reflected the level of deficits of 
France and Germany at the time. (Mitchell, 2015: 131-2.) These arguments will be 
reviewed more closely in the next chapter. 
 
It is often argued that the euro was not designed by economists, but by politicians. In 
fact, there were plenty of economists involved in the creation process, but their 
theoretical perspective was quite biased. Stiglitz notes that “a misguided economic 
ideology that was prevalent at the time” led to creation of a structurally flawed 
monetary union. (2017: 10.) Mitchell argues along the same lines that the Maastricht 
process represents a neoliberal groupthink, which held that “macroeconomic policy 
would concentrate largely on price stability with strict rules on deficits and that the 
changes to the Treaty would ensure Member states would accomplish a convergence 
in their economic policies (Mitchell, 2015: 136).” 
 
In addition, low inflation rate was set as a priority. Mitchell calls this the inflation 
first monetary policy obsession. The inflation first strategy, however, may have 
caused adverse outcomes by undermining economic growth, causing reduced output, 
and growing unemployment as central banks raise interest rates. These implications 
were largely ignored. Mitchell sees the neoliberal groupthink as the major failure 
when the union was created. (2015: 165-7.) 
 
Nevertheless, the euro’s founders did not ignore the risks involved in the monetary 
union altogether. The main concern was to leave fiscal policies to national 
governments. One of the greatest fears was that if a member state ran into difficulties 
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with its debt, others may have to bail it out rather than let it default. Sandbu argues 
that the moral premise of the monetary union was “that the prospect of a member 
state defaulting on its debt should be avoided as a matter of joint responsibility, in a 
way that a country’s inflating away its debt had never been. (Sandbu, 2017).”  
 
1.2 The crisis begins: 2008 as a watershed 
 
In 2008, housing bubble burst in the United States, which resulted in a global 
financial crisis. Soon after, recession hit Europe and turned into a balance-of-
payment crisis in 2010. This can be seen as a watershed in the history of the euro, 
since the euro area never truly recovered from the crisis. In addition, the debt crisis 
revealed deep ideological frictions between the Southern and Northern members of 
the monetary union, as well as several structural shortcomings. 
 
European debt crisis was not only an economic crisis, but also a political one. 
(Christopherson et al, 2015: 843–853) The economic problems have exacerbated the 
political fragmentation, and vice versa. Mainstream political parties keep losing 
popularity, while far-right and far-left euro skeptic parties gain support. At the 
national level, policymaking is becoming increasingly difficult as parties with 
divergent views, and with little history of co-operation, attempt to form 
governments. The fragmentation of the European political landscape causes 
uncertainty and unpredictability, which in turn weakens the economic prospects.  
 
As Barry Eichengreen puts it: “The acute phase of the crisis is over, but the chronic 
phase remains”. (2015: 415-422.) The economic problems of the eurozone have 
become chronic, and many economists have been for a while anticipating a new 
recession to hit Europe and the world economy. Europe is trapped in a vicious 
downward circle, which is increasingly seen as a consequence of misconceived 
crises management of the so-called Troika.  
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Troika, which refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the European Commission, chose to impose severe austerity 
programs on the crisis countries. The crisis countries received rescue loans with 
strong conditions attached. For instance, they were required to lower their deficits 
below the level of 3 percent. The Troika insisted that this objective could not be 
achieved without austerity policies and several structural reforms. These structural 
reforms included cutting the government expenditure and pursuing lower wages in 
the public and private sector. (Stiglitz: 17-19.) 
 
However, these structural reforms and austerity policies have not helped the 
eurozone to recover. As Stiglitz notes, the crises policies have been nothing but 
counterproductive. The simple reason for this is that austerity leads to higher level of 
unemployment and weakens the demand, thus resulting in declining economic 
growth in the long run. The interesting question is, why did this come as a surprise to 
decision-makers, given that several economists have repeatedly warned about the 
counterproductive effects of austerity policies? (2017: 183.)  
 
Stiglitz argues that certain ideas and beliefs of how economies function have 
misguided the whole euro project since the beginning. These ideas and beliefs played 
a key role in Troika’s crises policies. This ideology, which Stiglitz calls market 
fundamentalism or neoliberalism, is based on the belief that markets are efficient and 
stable if only the level of inflation is controlled, even if it requires high level of 
unemployment to prevail. (2017: 15-16, 25.) 
 
In 2019, the tone started to change among the leaders of IMF and ECB. Troika 
members seem to be acknowledging now that the austerity measures are not 
working. Mario Draghi and Christine Lagarde have been urging the eurozone 
countries to loosen their purse strings to stimulate the economy. These statements 
may indicate a paradigm shift in attitudes towards debt and in regards of economic 
policies more generally.   
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1.3 Outbreak of the COVID-19 
 
The COVID-19 outbreak started in December 2019 in the city of Wuhan in China. In 
a matter of a couple of months, the virus spread across the planet, resulting in 
unprecedented lockdown measures all over the world. Businesses are fighting for 
their existence, unemployment rates are skyrocketing, and the capacity of healthcare 
systems is jeopardized.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic ushered in a new crisis for the eurozone. The extent of the 
economic crisis we are witnessing is unclear for the time being. Much depends on 
how long the pandemic will last, and whether the EU manages to respond to the 
crisis in a coordinated manner. In any case, it is starting to crystalize that there will 
be long-term damage for the global economy, and especially for the already fragile 
EMU. Since the ongoing crisis has just started, there is not much academic literature 
on the economic and political consequences to rely on. Nevertheless, many analysts 
and commentators, who did not previously believe in the doomsday predictions for 
the eurozone, are now questioning the future of the EMU.  
 
The impact of the COVID-19 crisis in the future of the EMU is most likely twofold: 
it could serve as a driving force for deepening integration and solidarity, or it could 
intensify the frictions within the union. At the moment, it seems that the Northern 
EMU countries are not, once again, eager to rescue the suffering Southern 
counterparts. It seems that we are returning to the solidarity debates of the debt crisis 
of the early 2010s. There is a growing sentiment in Italy that the country is being 
abandoned by the EU. This sentiment is not restricted to anti-European thinkers, but 
thousands of pro-Europeans as well are changing their attitudes towards the union. 
Carlo Calenda, Italian permanent representative to the EU, argues that the EU is 
facing an existential threat, and he is not sure whether the EU will survive.  
 
The EMU’s future seems even more uncertain. We already knew that the EMU is 
incapable of responding to asymmetric shocks, but the economic crisis caused by 
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COVID-19 revealed that the EMU cannot even respond to symmetric shocks. 
(Financial Times, April 6 2020.) One must ask, is the COVID-19 pandemic the straw 
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
 
Theoretical framework of this study is a literature review on theories and 
perspectives regarding the problems of the euro. Theories discussed here serve as the 
backbone for the scenario analysis in chapter 4. The ideas by different authors 
presented here are quite divergent, even contradictory. The scenario methodology, 
which is discussed in the next chapter, allows us to combine and compare these 
theories and imagine how they may turn out in practice. 
 
The first subsection discusses the three central schools of thought that form the 
theoretical framework of this study. The second subsection looks at the European 
integration process from political perspective, emphasizing the interconnection 
between political and economic realms. The third section discusses the aspect of 
solidarity in Europe, which is the key to well-functioning common currency 
according to neo-Keynesian theory. Subsection 2.4. focuses on the Neo-Keynesian 
view that the problems of the euro are essentially due to flawed design of the union. 
Subsection 2.5. explores the North-South divide within the eurozone and the 
controversial role of Germany. Subsection 2.6. discusses social and fiscal reforms 
that could save the eurozone, after which subsection 2.7. argues that the eurozone 
divorce is an option. The chapter concludes by discussing the view that there is 
nothing wrong with the euro itself, but the problems lay in bad policymaking, mostly 
at the national level. 
 
2.1 Central schools of thought 
 
There is a vast literature on the problems of the EMU and the reforms needed. 
Naturally, this thesis cannot cover all of it, so some level of categorization and 
generalization must be carried out. The views on the EMU’s problems and potential 
solutions are quite divided, which also reflects prevailing disagreements within the 
field of macroeconomics in general. If we look at the big picture, we can distinguish 
between the main schools of thought that dominate macroeconomics and the EMU 
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debate. School of thought refers here to a group of academics who share similar 
views regarding the EMU’s problems and desirable solutions.  
 
An insightful distinction between dominant views on how the EMU should be 
governed and reformed is developed by De Ville and Berckvens. They propose a 
distinction between neoclassical and neo-Keynesian theories in terms of desired 
short-term reforms, and between ordoliberals and euro-federalists in regards of long-
term reforms. (De Ville & Berckvens, 2015: 8.) The line between these theoretical 
orientations is not always crystal clear, yet the distinction allows us to understand 
better the disagreement between the different accounts of the causes of the eurozone 
problems and how to fix them.  
 
According to De Ville and Berckvens, the distinction between neoclassical and neo-
Keynesian theories is based on finding short-term solutions to the euro crisis. The 
standard neoclassical explanation of the eurozone problems holds that the balance-
of-payment crisis, that followed the financial crisis of 2008, was mainly caused by 
unsustainable levels of public debt of certain member states, which in turn hinders 
economic growth. Fiscal consolidation is the key to restart economic growth, as it 
helps to restore the confidence of investors. Inflexible labor markets and excessive 
public expenditure are considered as main problems, which requires austerity 
measures and structural reforms aiming at cutting wages and public expenditure. 
Quite the contrary, neo-Keynesians argue that looser fiscal and monetary policies 
could help overcome the eurozone problems, as stimulating the economy paves the 
way to full employment, which is seen as the key to economic growth. Restructuring 
unsustainable levels of debt is also required. (De Ville & Berckvens, 2015: 8-9.) 
 
The distinction between ordoliberals and euro-federalists is mainly focused on the 
long-term reform of the EMU. Ordoliberals believe that un-negotiable rigorous rules 
are needed for a stable and sustainable monetary union. Any arrangements aiming at 
a transfer union will potentially lead to moral hazard. Euro-federalists argue that the 
monetary union requires fiscal and political union in order to function. Thus, a 
  11 
common eurozone budget is necessary for counter-cyclical expenditure. (De Ville & 
Berckvens, 2015: 8-10.) 
 
Ordoliberalism is often described as a German variant of neoclassical theory. 
According to Meiers (2015), “Germany’s post-war social market economy premises 
on the theory of ordoliberalism”. The key element that separates ordoliberal theory 
from neoclassical theory is the idea that a strong state is needed to surveille the free 
economy, guarantee its stability, and ensure free market competition among self-
interested individuals. Freedom is seen from the perspective of rule-based freedom. 
In terms of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, ordoliberals and neo-
classicists share similar views. Ordoliberal theory highlights individual 
responsibility. Fiscal discipline is seen as a virtue and only remedy to current 
account imbalances. This is the reason behind ordoliberals’ reluctance towards EMU 
reforms, especially the social and fiscal ones. (Meiers, 2015; De Ville & Berckvens, 
2015: 9.) 
 
As De Ville and Berckvens note, the line is not clear-cut between these schools of 
thought. Neoclassicists and ordoliberals tend to converge in many questions, while 
neo-Keynesians and euro-federalists are mostly in accord. One can disagree with De 
Ville and Berckvens regarding the categorization of these theoretical orientations in 
the long-term and short-term frameworks. Both neoclassical and neo-Keynesian 
theories do offer ideas related to the long-term governing principles of the EMU. 
Vice versa, both ordoliberals and euro-federalist have preferences regarding the 
necessary short-term policy responses. In addition, it should be noted that euro-
federalism is not an economic school of thought per se, but rather a pro-European 
ideology that champions the benefits of accelerating European integration.  
 
This thesis deploys De Ville’s and Berckven’s distinction, while acknowledging that 
neoclassical, neo-Keynesian, ordoliberal and euro-federalist accounts are not always 
mutually exclusive or tied to a certain time frame. Euro-federalism is not considered 
here as an economic theory, but rather a political orientation supporting European 
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integration. Thus, the theories discussed in the next subsections represent mostly 
neoclassical, neo-Keynesian and ordoliberal schools of thought. It should also be 
noted that the scholars, to whom this thesis refers in connection to these theoretical 
orientations, do not necessarily consider themselves as representing the given 
orientation. The categorization is based on the extent to which their arguments 
reflect certain way of thinking.  
 
2.2 Political aspect 
 
There are two main starting points from political perspective in this thesis that 
constitute the narratives of the scenarios. The first is that any further European 
integration requires transfers of sovereignty at all levels (Castells, 2017). The second 
is that democracy, national determination, and hyper-globalization cannot co-exist 
(Rodrik, 2011). At first sight, these two arguments seem rather similar. However, the 
first argument categorically excludes a possibility of any further European 
integration unless power is transferred from the member states towards the European 
level, whereas the second argument allows us to differentiate between hyper-
integration and better integration. A closer look at these theories below reveals the 
logic behind this reasoning.  
 
Manuel Castells et al. discuss the multiple crises that Europe is facing, including 
economic, social, political, ideological, and migratory. The authors emphasize the 
interconnectedness of these crises, starting from the assumption that all these 
institutional crises arise from inherent flaws in the system. In the long run, the 
dysfunctional system may even break down altogether. (2017: 3-4.) 
 
Oliver Bouin discusses the European integration process from the perspective of 
political economy. According to Bouin, the process of European integration has been 
dominated by private sector and market interests. The process is characterized by a 
democracy deficit and some degree of “forced integration”, as the integration process 
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was not based on a social market economy model which is supported by most of the 
European citizens.  
 
What about the euro? Firstly, Bouin points out the systemic flaws of the Euro that 
originate from political motives, aspiring deeper European integration, in the making 
of Maastricht Treaty. Bouin refers to Feldstein (1992, 1997) and Krugman (1993) 
who argue that the eurozone would be optimal currency area for some member 
countries, while producing turbulence and shocks within the area for the rest. Their 
prediction of looming problems was based on three key factors: the heterogeneity of 
countries, the inadequate mobility of labor between the countries and the lack of 
fiscal transfers.  
 
Besides the inherent flaws in the euro, Bouin emphasizes several policy mistakes 
that have worsened the situation. A case deserving special attention is the response to 
the crisis of 2008 by European Central Bank (ECB). The drastic austerity programs 
implemented on the troubled countries of the eurozone resulted in a recession in 
2012. However, 2012 can be seen as a turning point when the management of the 
crisis took a new direction: restructuring of Greece’s debt was on the table, fiscal 
instruments, such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM), were created to serve as 
a lender of last resort for the eurozone. Also, ECB launched massive quantitative 
easing programs aiming at stimulating the economy. (Castells, 2017: 35-40.) It 
should be noted that both ESM and quantitative easing programs are highly 
criticized. ESM has strong conditions attached to receiving the loans. Furthermore, 
receiving more loan does little to help countries with already unsustainable levels of 
debt.  
 
Boudin argues that European integration process cannot continue on the same 
grounds. Any further integration would require “additional transfers of sovereignty 
on fiscal, social and political levels and has moved closer to the ultimate goal of 
political federalism that is definitely not an objective for many member states 
(Castells, 2017: 35.)” Most importantly, deepening integration requires enhanced 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the European citizens. (Castells, 2017: 40-45.) Boudin’s 
argument leaves us with two options: deepening integration by shifting more power 
towards the center or disintegration through relocating the power to the national 
level. There is, however, a middle ground between these two extremes.  
 
Dani Rodrik’s globalization paradox provides a useful theoretical framework to 
highlight the idea that more national determination does not necessarily translate into 
less European integration. Globalization paradox reflects the fundamental political 
trilemma of the global economy: democracy, national determination and economic 
hyper-globalization cannot be pursued simultaneously. Given these options, Rodrik 
would sacrifice hyper-globalization. We must be realists regarding the reality of 
world politics. National governments will remain the key actors to the foreseeable 
future. Rodrik argues that we need better globalization, not maximum globalization. 
In fact, re-empowering national democracies might lead to better globalization. 
(Rodrik, 2011: 200-207.) Rodrik’s political trilemma can be applied to European 
integration as well. Can democracy, national determination and European hyper-
integration co-exist? From eurozone perspective, re-empowering national 
democracies might lead to better European integration. We need better European 
integration, not maximum integration.  
 
2.3 Lack of solidarity 
 
As the aspect of solidarity in the EMU is a major source of disagreement between 
the member states, it is worth elaborating how exactly the lack of solidarity appears 
in Europe. The solidarity debate also reflects the divide between the main schools of 
thought. Neo-Keynesians and euro-federalists consider solidarity as crucial, yet 
missing, factor for a well-functioning monetary union, while ordoliberals and several 
neoclassicists oppose any solidarity-based reforms. 
 
Marcel Fratzcher’s observations on solidarity in Europe during the euro crisis are 
quite intriguing. Fratzcher (2018) argues that there is a growing conflict about 
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Germany’s role in Europe. In November 2016, Fratzcher attended a closed-door 
meeting of European policymakers and leading academics. The purpose of the 
meeting was to have an open discussion on Brexit, euro crisis and refugee crisis. The 
German participants expressed their disappointment about the lack of solidarity 
when Germany was dealing with the influx of refugees. The Germans argued that 
they helped other European countries with financial crisis, showing great solidarity 
and support, and after all this they received no help whit their refugee issues. Almost 
all other participants in the meeting argued exactly the opposite, as they felt that 
Germany had acted in a very selfish manner during the economic crisis, pursuing its 
own interest, while imposing questionable fiscal austerity measures on others. In 
addition, the German economic policy based on improving their cost 
competitiveness through “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy has caused economic 
disadvantage to other European countries. (2018: 5-6.)  
 
“Seldom have I ever seen a discussion with positions being farther apart and more 
irreconcilable than that of Germany’s role in Europe. Yet the key for Europe’s future 
today and in the coming decade will not be Britain’s exit from the EU, Greece’s fate, 
or the future of Europe’s banking union, but rather whether this divide between 
Germany and Europe can be bridged and whether Germany can be prevented from 
disengaging with Europe and turning inwards (Fratzcher, 2018: 7).” 
 
Germany is often considered as egoistic and self-interested, pursuing its own 
national benefit at the expense of the other Europeans. Germany imposes austerity 
policies on other countries, while being the main cause of the EMU’s economic and 
financial imbalances. In addition, Germany’s actions in the refugee crisis were seen 
as controversial, since it paid little attention when Italy and Greece were the 
countries most affected, but when Germany itself started to be the country most 
affected, it started to complain. (2018: 132-3.) 
 
“The common narrative is that the German government was too passive and 
complacent in fighting the European crisis, agreeing highly reluctantly, too late, and 
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with too little support in various crisis situations. Germany agreed to the creation of 
a banking union, the common rescue mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and various rescue programs too late or endowed or designed them not 
sufficiently well—so goes the accusation of some (Fratzcher, 2018: 132).” 
 
Germany’s view, however, differs radically from the common European narrative. 
Quite the contrary, Fratzcher argues that a majority of the Germans consider 
themselves as victims of the European crisis. Troika imposed structural reforms and 
fiscal discipline on the crisis countries, and Germany has been the main contributor 
to the rescue programs. Germans also disagree with the view that Germany’s 
economic policies have been harmful for other Europeans. It is the unsustainable 
fiscal and social policies of others that have caused the instability, and Germany has 
managed to provide some degree of stability during the crisis. Germany has 
implemented hard reforms in order to restore its global competitiveness, and the 
other countries should follow their example. (2018: 133-4.) 
 
There is a crystal-clear contradiction between the view that Germany has been the 
main influencer behind the misconceived crisis policies, and the perception that 
Germany was forced to rescue the crisis countries at the expense of its own. (2018: 
136-8.) This perception has been exacerbated by provocative media stories on how 
the taxpayers will have to pay for the mistakes of lazy Greeks laying under the olive 
trees. 
 
The diverging views and mutual scapegoating that dominate European politics have 
deepened political divisions between the member states, and European cooperation is 
increasingly displaced by nationalist interests. Populism, protectionism, and 
paralysis are the future concerns, according to Fratzcher. The expansion of populism 
has been further enhanced by politicians themselves, as they have blamed the EU for 
failures, while taking the credit when succeeding. (2018: 167.) 
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In the midst of the corona crisis of 2020, the solidarity debates are surfacing again. 
Italy has replaced Greece as the pariah of the union, and anti-European sentiment is 
rapidly rising in Italy. In the heart of the dispute is, once again, whether to rescue the 
Southern EMU members through fiscal aid. The debate is, however, much deeper 
than just a matter of financial instruments required to tackle the crisis. The German 
daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published recently an advert written by Carlo 
Calenda, Italian permanent representative to the EU, in which he accuses the 
Netherlands and Germany of lack of ethics and solidarity. Moreover, Financial 
Times published a letter signed by leading economists, who call for debt 
mutualization and solidarity to survive from the COVID-19 crisis. “We need a 
common debt instrument in order to mutualise the fiscal costs of fighting this crisis. 
Now is time for action. Now is the time for solidarity. It is time for eurobonds. 
(Financial Times, 23 March 2020, 6 April 2020.)” 
 
Nevertheless, the response from Germany, according to Financial Times, is that 
emotional arguments should be left out from the debate, and Italy should not blame 
its problems on Europe and Germany. (Financial Times, April 6 2020.) This 
illustrates the fundamental antagonisms in Europe, that quite frankly seem 
unresolvable. The Northern countries refuse to see the economic problems in 
connection to solidarity and ethics, while the Southern countries insist that it is 
fundamentally a matter of solidarity and ethics.  
 
What are the implications of the solidarity debate to the EMU? It can be argued that 
the aspect of solidarity is indeed crucial for the functioning of the EMU. Theory of 
embedded currency areas supports this argument. The key objective of the euro was 
to reduce transaction costs and reduce interest rate and exchange rate volatility 
between the countries. The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA), pioneered by 
Robert Mundell, states that there are certain geographical areas, not bounded by 
national borders, that could benefit from a common currency. In times of economic 
disturbances, an OCA takes advantage from fixed prices, if full employment can be 
achieved without exchange rate adjustments, for instance through free movement of 
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labor and capital, wage and price flexibility, or private or government transfers 
between countries. (Sandbu, 2017.)  
 
When founding the euro, there was a widespread belief that the eurozone would be 
an optimum currency area that would benefit from a common currency. However, 
not everyone agreed that the eurozone would be an optimum currency area. 
Economists such as Krugman (1993) and Fieldstein (1992, 1997) predicted quite the 
opposite. They argued that the eurozone would be an optimum currency area for 
some member countries, while producing turbulence and shocks within the area for 
the rest of the countries. This argument is by no means novel today, but rather a 
standard explanation for root causes of the euro crisis. Eurozone did not constitute 
optimum currency area with free mobility of capital, labor, and goods, which 
resulted in asymmetric shocks.  
 
More importantly, the eurozone did not constitute an embedded currency area 
(ECA). This concept is developed by Matthijs and Blyth (2015), who argue that 
OCA must be embedded in shared political and social frameworks that enable it to 
respond in asymmetric shocks. In other words, when a country is facing a shock, it 
cannot be bailed out because there is a lack of transnational solidarity that would 
legitimize a bailout policy. (Schwartz, Acta Polit (2016) 51: 403.)  
 
If we look at the solidarity debate from the ECA perspective, there is no way forward 
until the EMU is embedded in shared political and social frameworks, that build the 
foundation for social integration within the EMU. For eurozone to become an OCA, 
it must first become an ECA. As illustrated in this subsection, transnational 
solidarity in Europe is a complex question and a major source of divergence between 
the member states.  
 
2.4 Design flaws 
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Many neo-Keynesian academics argue that the defects of the euro were coined 
already in the creation process. As discussed in chapter 1, dynamics behind the 
Maastricht process may reveal a great deal of root causes for the eurozone’s 
problems. According to neo-Keynesian theories, driving forces behind the creation 
of the EMU were ideological biases and promotion of the interests of the key 
players, namely France and Germany, which led to establishing counterproductive 
convergence criteria (see chapter 1). This subsection takes a closer look at the 
“design flaws” view, which is mostly supported by neo-Keynesian academics. 
Different economic structures and diversity in Europe, lack of social cohesion, 
inadequate mandate of the ECB, and lack of monetary sovereignty are of great 
importance here.  
 
Joseph Stiglitz’s argues that the problems of the euro are direct consequences of its 
flawed birth. Stiglitz emphasizes that the euro was above all a political project, 
aiming at a united and stronger Europe. However, there was not enough political 
cohesion to create economic institutions needed to make it work. It is often argued 
that the eurozone countries did not have enough economic similarity. However, even 
similar economic structures do not guarantee that the countries share similar “belief 
systems”. Stiglitz notes that economists have systematically neglected the political 
and social conditions needed for a well-functioning monetary union. Economists do 
acknowledge that there should have been necessary institutions to support the 
monetary union, but the reason why such institutions were not established is related 
to lack of political unity and solidarity. For Stiglitz, solidarity precedes political 
integration, as high level of solidarity builds confidence in collective decision-
making and increases willingness to give up national sovereignty. (Stiglitz, 2017: 52-
53.) 
 
It is safe to say that economic integration has outpaced political integration in 
Europe. When creating the euro, it was assumed that economic integration would 
automatically result in political integration. This aspiration did not realize. (2017: 
35.) Stiglitz argues that eurozone’s failures stem largely from “combination of a 
misguided economic ideology and a lack of deep political solidarity”. (2017: 4-11.) 
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In addition to good institutions, a common currency needs solidarity or social 
cohesion, which is straightforwardly missing in the EMU. (2017: 22.) This leads us 
to one of Stiglitz’s main arguments: certain ideas and beliefs of how economies 
function misguided the whole euro process from the beginning. In other words, the 
problems lie in the ideology behind the euro, which led both to flawed structure of 
the euro and to flawed policies. This ideology, which Stiglitz calls market 
fundamentalism or neoliberalism, is based on the belief that markets are efficient and 
stable, if the level of inflation is controlled, even if it requires high level of 
unemployment to prevail. (2017: 15-16, 25.)  
 
According to Stiglitz, the main structural flaws of the euro are design flaws by 
nature. Due to diversity in Europe, one of the main flaws is that the member states 
have transferred their control over exchange and interest rates to European Central 
Bank (ECB). Common interest rate for such a diverse set of countries is problematic 
since the economic cycles are different in each country. One country might be facing 
inflation which would require raising the interest rate, whereas another country may 
be in a recession and in need of lowering the interest rate. Naturally, a single interest 
rate cannot serve the needs of the both countries simultaneously so someone must 
take the bullet. (2017: 87-8) 
 
Convergence criteria was intended to overcome the problem of diversity. In 
retrospect, the presumption that these differences would not matter, if only the 
member states kept their deficits and debts under control, was misguided. The 
diversity in Europe is related to different economic structures, so the differences will 
remain even if the level of deficits and debt is controlled. In fact, convergence 
criteria resulted in growing divergence in the eurozone through eliminating the use 
of fiscal policy as a tool when facing economic downturn. Convergence criteria 
required countries to cut expenditure and raise taxes, which effectively weakened 
total demand when the exact opposite would have been needed. (2017: 93-4.) 
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Another evidence of flawed structure of the eurozone for Stiglitz is its poor 
economic performance. Comparison between the eurozone and other similar 
countries reveals striking differences in real GDP per capita growth after the 2008 
financial crisis. E.g. the United States per capita GDP has increased 3 percent 
between 2007 and 2015, whereas the eurozone has declined 1.8 percent. Moreover, 
even before the crisis, there was no overall growth spike in the eurozone after 
adopting the common currency. (2017: 68-70.) Besides the euro, also the ECB was 
flawed at birth. ECB’s mandate is limited to controlling inflation, which in fact is the 
least of the problems the eurozone is facing today. Stiglitz compares this with the US 
Federal Reserve, which is mandated to maintain growth and full employment, 
besides controlling inflation. Again, ideology explains a great deal of the ECB’s 
flaws. Stiglitz argues that the belief in market fundamentalism, which played key 
role when creating the euro, translated into ECB’s narrow focus on inflation. What 
Stiglitz calls fixation on inflation led to ignoring financial stability. In addition, the 
ECB contributed to Europe’s growing inequality. (2017: 146-50.) 
 
Another related problem in the EMU is that the ECB is not allowed to finance the 
general governments. There is a supranational organization in charge of monetary 
policy, without any supranational authorities to ensure its accountability. Holappa 
argues from Neo-Chartalist perspective that the EMU reduced the debt resilience of 
its member countries as they lost their monetary policy sovereignty. Holappa 
emphasizes the problems of economic policy based on improving cost 
competitiveness, because in practice, this translates into low domestic demand and 
stagnant wages. Germany has created its current account surplus utilizing this 
strategy, which is not sustainable from the perspective of other EMU countries. 
(Holappa, 2016: 10-12.)  
 
According to Patomäki, the main problem of the EMU is that there is a monetary 
union without a political union. It has no federal budget or other mechanisms for 
balancing surpluses and deficits within the union, and central bank funding is 
prohibited. This allows the private debt markets to dominate the member countries 
  22 
who have lost their tools to exercise monetary policy. This in turn has led to 
escalating political crisis and lack of legitimacy. (Patomäki: 2013: 128-9.) 
 
Stiglitz argues that the hegemonic political discourse in the eurozone, there is no 
alternative (TINA), is problematic. There are indeed alternatives and reforms that 
would make the euro work. TINA discourse is based on the belief that the crisis is 
due to individual countries’ reckless finances and fiscal failures. Stiglitz argues that 
the crisis was caused collectively through flawed structures and policies. Thus, social 
and fiscal reforms are needed in terms of the eurozone structure, not in individual 
member states. (Stiglitz, 2017: 11, 28.)  
 
2.5 North-South divide 
 
As noted in the subsection 2.3., Germany’s role in the EMU is highly controversial. 
Several economists argue that Germany enjoys disproportionate economic advantage 
in the EMU at the expense of other member states, especially the Southern ones 
(often referred to as periphery). There is a tremendous imbalance between the trade 
surpluses of Germany and other eurozone member states. The German economic 
strategy is based on internal devaluations, which means restricting growth of wages. 
This “low-demand, low-import” strategy undermines the balance of budgets within 
the EMU (Krahé & Adler, The Guardian). 
 
The imbalances stemming from Germany’s excessive surpluses are related to a more 
fundamental problem, which is a growing North-South divide within the EMU. The 
North-South divide reflects divergent political and economic visions within the EU 
and after the euro crisis, the division has extended to economic performance and 
wealth. Even more importantly, the euro crisis changed the balance of power within 
the EU as the poorer members became debtors and wealthier became creditors. The 
wealthier members dominate the economic policymaking and dictate the structural 
reform conditions attached to financial aid programs. (Jokela, 2013.)  
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Regan analyzes the North-South divide within the EMU in the framework of 
varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory. Regan sees the North-South divide as the main 
reason behind the problems of the EMU, and the real source of the euro crisis. His 
main argument is that merging two different macroeconomic regimes resulted in 
growing imbalances. According to Regan, there are two variants of Capitalism in the 
eurozone. The Northern European countries can be labelled as coordinated market 
economies, whereas the Southern European countries represent Mediterranean VoC. 
These variants of Capitalism form two distinct “macroeconomic growth regimes” 
within the eurozone: the growth of the Southern economies is based on “domestic 
demand-led models”, while the Northern economies represent “export-led models” 
(Regan, 2015). 
 
There are competing views on what kind of reforms are needed to resolve the 
eurozone problems. Interestingly, the desirability of social and fiscal reforms seems 
to correlate with the North-South divide, also reflecting the controversial position of 
Germany. De Ville and Berckvens (2015) conducted a survey among eurozone 
academics to find out their preferences on how the EMU should be reformed. Their 
most important finding is that German academics (and Finnish, but only with 5 
respondents) are strikingly more reluctant than their counterparts from other member 
states towards reforms related to social and fiscal union.  
 
The survey concludes that no consensus on EMU reforms has been achieved among 
eurozone academics after the euro crisis. Quite the contrary, the findings indicate 
growing dissensus, that also reflects North-South divide (core-periphery divide). The 
respondents from Southern member states generally support reforms aiming at social 
and fiscal union, while the support from Northern member states is clearly lower. 
Opposition from German respondents, however, is striking. The opinions of the 
academics correspond with the outspoken preferences of their national governments. 
(De Ville & Berckvens, 2015.) 
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Based on the findings of De Ville and Berckvens, it can be assumed that clear 
national differences persist regarding the preferable future direction of the EMU, and 
Germany stands out as particularly reluctant towards social and fiscal reforms. In 
terms of the four main schools of thought, neo-Keynesians and euro-federalists tend 
to be more supportive towards social and fiscal reforms, whereas neoclassicists and 
ordoliberals are inclined to oppose the reforms. In the next subsection, these reforms 
are discussed in more detail. 
 
2.6 Social and fiscal reforms 
 
From neo-Keynesian and euro-federalist perspective, certain social and fiscal 
reforms could make a single currency work for an area as diverse as the eurozone. 
Stiglitz lays out a comprehensive proposal on how to fix the design flaws of the 
euro. First of all, Stiglitz argues that the key objective should be full employment, 
which would require major reforms to the structure of the eurozone. In other words, 
the institutions, rules, and regulations that govern the eurozone must be redesigned 
to maintain full employment. The reforms Stiglitz suggests would require an 
ideological shift from the prevailing neoliberal agenda. (2017: 240.)  
 
The number one reform would be creation of a banking union. According to Barry 
Eichengreen and Stiglitz, the major shortcoming of the monetary union is the 
absence of a banking union. Banking union could help overcome the problem of 
financial instability and the lack of governance and supervision by providing a 
common deposit insurance and common regulations for all banks in the EMU. 
Banking integration would enhance financial stability through common standards 
and harmonize the banking regulation between the countries. It would also provide a 
resolution mechanism for banking failures with a mandate to intervene in situations 
that threaten stability of the financial system, while increasing the coherence of the 
whole eurozone. Stiglitz argues that the banking union must entail a common deposit 
mechanism, which ensures that money will not flow from weak to strong countries. 
Common regulation system prevents potential abuses of a common deposit 
insurance. Creation of a banking union was agreed in 2012 as it was deemed to be a 
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crucial step to solve the euro crisis. (Christopherson et al, 2015: 415-422; Stiglitz, 
2017: 241.)  
 
Even though the banking union is considered as vital in order to prevent the 
increasing divergence within the eurozone, it has never truly realized. Northern 
member states, Germany being the most vocal of them, are worried that the banking 
union would result in a transfer union, in which money is transferred from the strong 
countries to the weak. (Stiglitz, 2017: 129-130.) 
 
Secondly, Stiglitz argues that some level of mutualization of debt is needed to 
prevent divergence in the eurozone. Interestingly, several neoclassicist-oriented 
economists agree that debt restructurings for heavily indebted countries are needed. 
Martin Wolf proposes establishing debt relief programs for countries that meet 
specific criteria under the initiative of IMF and World bank that started in 1996. 
(Martin Wolf, Irish Times, January 27 2015.) Moreover, Financial Times published 
in March 2020 a letter signed by several leading economists, who call for eurobonds 
and debt mutualization for eurozone to survive from the COVID-19 crisis. (Financial 
Times, March 23 2020.) It seems that there is a growing consensus between 
economists from different theoretical and ideological backgrounds regarding 
importance of debt mutualization within the eurozone. 
 
Thirdly, the eurozone must create a common framework for stability. This requires 
reform of the Maastricht convergence criteria, creation of a solidarity fund for 
economically troubled countries, introducing automatic stabilizers for countries 
facing an economic downturn, creating credit flexibility, stronger regulation for the 
markets that create instability, and finally, redesigning fiscal policies in an active 
counter-cyclical way. (Stiglitz, 2017: 243-44.)  
 
Fourthly, Stiglitz suggests reforms aiming at a true convergence policy. The 
excessive surpluses of certain eurozone countries drive divergence. Thus, a policy 
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that discourages accumulating surpluses is necessary in order to balance the 
surpluses and deficits within the eurozone. This could be achieved through Keynes’s 
proposition of a tax on surpluses. The revenues would then be used to fund a 
solidarity fund for economically weaker countries. In addition, the surplus countries 
should abandon the strategy of internal devaluation through raising their minimum 
wages and engaging in expansionary fiscal policies. In addition, the eurozone should 
support the poorer countries to enhance the quality of their infrastructure. Finally, the 
eurozone needs a structure that promotes full employment and growth. For this end, 
Stiglitz proposes reforming the mandate of the ECB, which means broadening the 
scope beyond controlling the inflation towards promoting full employment, growth, 
and stability. (Stiglitz, 2017: 252-57.) 
 
2.7 Eurozone divorce 
 
There are numerous theories how a single member state could unilaterally exit the 
EMU. Any viable exit model must address a multitude of technical issues, such as 
handling euro denominated public and private debt, euro denominated bank deposits, 
ensuring economic stability, managing inflation etc. A controlled and coordinated 
break up process of the entire monetary union seems an unlikely scenario. (Mitchell, 
2015: 394.)  
 
Determining the best exit strategy is not the purpose here, but rather to demonstrate 
that exiting the eurozone is an actual option and does not necessarily translate into an 
apocalypse, as the mainstream economic models predict. This apocalypse reasoning 
is vividly illustrated in the next quote by Martin Wolf. “Breaking up would be hugely 
traumatic, financially and economically. It would also threaten the survival of the 
EU itself, which has always been built on a foundation of economic integration. The 
single market would quite possibly collapse. So, then, might the possibility of co-
operative relations. (Martin Wolf, Financial Times, January 15 2019.)” 
 
  27 
Moreover, there is a widespread belief that the EMU divorce would automatically 
translate into the divorce of the EU as well. This is a crucial aspect of TINA 
discourse that prevents European decision-makers from even thinking about future 
without the euro. As de Weck and Valatsas put it: “European leaders need to find the 
courage to tell their populations the truth: There will be more Europe, or no Europe. 
(Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020).” 
 
According to Mitchell, eurozone exit must be accompanied with abandoning the neo-
liberal austerity ideology and restoring nation’s currency sovereignty. (2015: 395.) 
This ideological shift is the first step towards dissolution of the eurozone. If the 
hegemonic TINA discourse dominates decision-making, there is no room for 
alternative economic policies. After the first leap of faith, there are several ways to 
tackle the transaction costs and fiscal issues related to the process. 
 
Mitchell’s argument above is related to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), according 
to which the states that enjoy currency sovereignty, cannot go bankrupt. At the heart 
of MMT lies the endogenous money theory, which rejects the textbook theory of 
how money is created. MMT is based on the idea that money is created when banks 
issue loans. If a government issues and controls the currency it taxes and spends, it 
cannot default. (Matthews, 2019.) From MMT perspective, the main problem for the 
eurozone is the lack of monetary sovereignty. This leaves the eurozone with two 
options. The first is to transform into a federal union, and the second is to return to 
national currencies. 
 
Stiglitz argues that a eurozone divorce can be carried out in an amicable manner, 
without excessive costs. Obviously, there will be some costs in case of a country 
leaving the eurozone. However, the costs of preserving the status quo will be 
tremendously higher. (Stiglitz, 2017: 272-73.) In practice, how could a country leave 
the euro? Stiglitz uses Greece leaving the bloc as an example. First of all, the country 
needs a new financial system. Stiglitz argues this does not necessarily mean 
returning to the drachma. An entirely new financial system can be created, which 
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Stiglitz refers to as a “21st century financial transactions system”. The system is 
based on electronic money. Greece would create “the Greek-euro”, which would 
serve as the money inside the Greek banking system. The Greek-euro would have “a 
well-defined value relative to the ordinary euro”. (2017: 274-76.) 
 
After leaving the euro, Greece will have monetary sovereignty again, and thus ability 
to create credit. Moreover, the new financial system would be accompanied with 
21st-century banking system, allowing to overcome problems caused by private 
banks’ power to create credit. The key problem is increasing inequality that stems 
from tremendous rents and exploitation by the current banking system. In the 
framework of 21st-century banking system, governments could start regulating 
heavily the credit creation process and direct the credit towards productive 
investments, rather than accumulating private profits. However, the point of this 
reform is not only normative aspiration to interfere with bankers’ exploitation, but it 
is aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability. (2017: 279-84.) 
 
Finally, the exit by one of the crisis countries described above is not the only option. 
As a matter of fact, the easiest option in Stiglitz opinion would be that some of the 
more stable countries leaves the block (e.g. Germany, Netherlands or Finland). This 
would enable the eurozone to adjust the exchange rate to match the northern 
countries, which in turn would help balancing current accounts and stimulate growth 
through increased exports. (2017: 292-3.)  
 
Another solution to the eurozone problems according to Stiglitz is flexible euro. The 
flexible euro would mean that each country or a group of countries has its own euro, 
with a fluctuating value. Eventually, the national and regional euros could potentially 
achieve the goal of a single European currency. The flexible euro system would 
utilize the 21st century financial system that Stiglitz proposed related to the amicable 
divorce option. The value of each euro would vary relative to others. The current 
rigid exchange rates cause trade imbalances, so the flexible euro would provide 
stability in exchange rates. This would also allow the eurozone to abandon structural 
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reform programs that aim at internal devaluation to fix the problem of rigid exchange 
rates. (2017: 296-300.) 
 
2.8 Bad policy making 
 
This subsection explores reforming the EMU mostly from neoclassical perspective. 
According to neoclassical theory, the problems of the eurozone stem from the 
national level, not so much from the eurozone structure. As discussed earlier, the 
standard neoclassical cure for eurozone problems relies on austerity-based structural 
reforms. This subsection broadens the perspective from austerity to other potential 
remedies, emphasizing the responsibility of the member states.  
 
Sandbu (2017) argues that visions of a political and fiscal union are based on a 
paradox: more powers must be unified to fix the damage caused by unification. 
Moreover, the demands for greater integration are based on “politics of blackmail”, 
which refers to the discourse of “no alternatives”. Europe is trapped in a failed 
monetary union, and there is no alternative other than almost an apocalypse. 
According to Sandbu, this is a misperception – other options do exist. (Sandbu, 
2017.) 
 
Sandbu’s key argument is that the euro crisis was not a result of euro’s inherent birth 
flaws. The crisis escalated because of cardinal policy mistakes, mostly because the 
leaders wanted to avoid debt restructurings at any cost. Sandbu disagrees with the 
view that the euro prevented the decision-makers from managing the financial crisis. 
In addition, Sandbu disagrees with the idea of a crisis-prone nature of the euro. He 
opposes the view that the structure of the monetary union made the crisis more 
likely, since the crisis would have occurred with or without the monetary union. The 
global credit bubble in 2008 was not restricted to eurozone countries. The 
phenomenon of “compression of the borrowing costs” was not a euro-specific 
problem; it occurred at the global level and would have happened without the euro as 
well. (Sandbu, 2017.) This argument reflects the fundamental divide between 
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neoclassical and neo-Keynesian theories in terms of the EMU’s problems. 
Neoclassical theory assumes that the structure of the EMU is not flawed, whereas 
neo-Keynesian perspective emphasizes the union’s structural shortcomings. 
 
The euro is blamed for not allowing countries in trouble to devaluate their currency 
as they did before the euro, but this argument downplays the creditors’ 
responsibility. If financial markets allowed Greece to borrow from the same grounds 
as Germany, even though Greece is not capable of devaluating its currency, creditors 
should have noted the related risks. Moreover, effectiveness of monetary 
independence is widely exaggerated. The national governments did have tools to 
control the credit bubble and overborrowing.  (Sandbu, 2017.) 
 
The argument that the euro did not in fact restrict the policy tools of national 
governments to control the bubble that lead to the crisis reflects the idea that the 
member states tend to blame the euro for their own failures, which fuels anti-euro 
sentiment. According to Sandbu, it was not the design flaws of the euro, but policy 
mistakes at the national level that caused the crisis. Sandbu also addresses arguments 
regarding export competitiveness. It is true that prices and wages developed 
differently in the eurozone core and periphery, yet this did not happen in the traded 
sector, which is why Sandbu argues the euro cannot be blamed for export 
competitiveness problems.  
 
Main cause of the euro crisis, according to Sandbu, was “huge flows of capital, 
which came to a sudden stop in 2009-10 and knocked the receiving economies to a 
ground.” In addition, the euro is not to be blamed for the debt accumulation that led 
to the balance-of-payments crisis. The first reason for this is that the member states 
were not without tools to address the excessive debt accumulation. The second is that 
debt accumulation occurred simultaneously outside the eurozone as well. Sandbu 
suggests that the eurozone countries that borrowed recklessly would have done it 
irrespective of the currency they used.  
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Neo-Chartalists argue that a country with currency sovereignty cannot run into a 
default because it has the authority to create money. The argument goes that the 
eurozone countries lost their monetary sovereignty when joining the union, and thus 
cannot balance their economies (and debt) by printing money. Sandbu argues that the 
peripheral eurozone countries would have done the same without the euro by 
pegging their currencies to euro. Printing money would not have helped if the 
country had borrowed in foreign currency, as many of the eurozone countries did. In 
addition, “giving up the printing press” was a major motivation for many high-
interest and high-inflation countries to join the euro in the first place. Sandbu 
suggests that many of these countries would have tried to achieve monetary stability 
and quit printing money in any case.  
 
To sum up, Sandbu’s argument is based on the idea that the peripheral countries 
would have ended up in trouble whether they belonged to the euro or not. The 
evidence behind this argument is the similar situation of other European non-
eurozone countries during the crisis. The main problems lie in bad policy choices at 
the national level. The euro has become a scapegoat for the economic problems that 
are by no means unique to the eurozone, but rather originate from wider economic 
problems of Europe and the member states. Wider economic problems refer mostly 
to inadequate economic growth. Indeed, several analysts suggest that perhaps the 
most important fix to eurozone problems would be accelerating economic growth. 
(Eichengreen, 2015: 415-422.) This is, however, something Europe has been 
pursuing since the outburst of the crisis, with a relatively little success.  
 
Sandbu suggests there are three economic problems the eurozone member countries 
need to tackle. From his perspective, the problems are not euro’s problems, but 
problems of the member states. The first is to learn to deal with balance-of-payment 
crises, which is a matter of financial and monetary policy. The second is related to 
economy’s resources, namely level of employment and aggregate demand. The real 
economy must function properly. The last problem is to sustain economic growth 
and productivity. Solving these problems is not hindered by the euro. (Sandbu, 
2017.) 
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Sandbu agrees with neo-Keynesians regarding the tools for national governments to 
prevent crises and manage declining capital flows. Sandbu argues that debt 
restructuring would be the most effective tool for this. Unwillingness to carry out 
public and private debt restructurings was the major policy mistake when handling 
the eurozone debt crisis. The crisis could have been ended right in the beginning 
without the ideological resistance to restructure unsustainable levels of debt. The 
following mistake was to implement damaging fiscal and monetary policies as a 
condition for rescue loans. 
 
Sandbu disagrees with the conventional view of the euro critics that a monetary 
union requires a fiscal union to balance asymmetric shocks. The aggregate demand 
problem is often seen as Germany’s fault, as it is the most vocal proponent of 
austerity policies and runs excessive current account surplus. Germany opposes 
stimulus policies and is reluctant to loosen its own purse strings, urging other 
eurozone countries to handle better their finances. Germany believes firmly in black 
zero policies, which means having no fiscal deficit. Sandbu points out that the debt 
countries shared Germany’s view on austerity and tightened their budgets more than 
was even demanded. In addition, monetary policy mistakes were not solely 
Germany’s fault. The inadequate aggregate demand is largely related to waste of 
resources, as millions of unemployed people and unproductive investments do not 
enable economic growth.  
 
What constitutes better economic policies? Sandbu’s answer is twofold: the power 
must be sifted back from the regional level towards the national level, and the 
remaining power in the center must become more fit for purpose. At the European 
level, new direction in policy making means abandoning “no alternatives” discourse. 
For this to realize, Germany and France should play a decisive role, France being the 
first to start. While not being mandatory, a fiscal union would certainly bring 
benefits. There is no reason why countries considering a fiscal union as desirable 
could not create one. There is nothing in the structure of the euro that would prevent 
these countries. Renationalizing policy making, above all fiscal policy, would 
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transfer not only the power but also the responsibility back towards the national 
level. Sandbu suggests that “Paradoxically, greater national autonomy may 
encourage more integration”.  
 
According to Sandbu, the prospects for the eurozone are not at all that bleak as 
generally is assumed. Corrective measures are already taking place. Sandbu reminds 
us of the euro’s advantages. A single currency increases predictability for businesses, 
facilitates trade and investments within the monetary union, and removes the 
devaluation tool, which incentivizes governments and companies to fix problems 
related to low productivity. “To heal the politics of the euro, it must be admitted that 
it is compatible with more national self-determination than conventional wisdom has 
















  34 
3 Methodology 
 
This chapter begins with an assessment on the advantages of scenario analysis in 
general and proposes that scenario methodology can serve as innovative, yet 
scholarly and rigorous, way of producing “interesting research”. (Ramirez et al., 
2015.) The second subsection explains the scenario-building process and defines key 
concepts of scenario methodology. Finally, the chapter introduces the scenario 
matrix and key variables of the thesis.  
 
3.1 Scenario methodology 
 
Scenario analysis is increasingly common tool to prepare for the future in business 
strategies. Perhaps the greatest example is the one of Royal Dutch Shell in the oil 
crisis in 1973. While almost all other Western institutions were unprepared for the 
crisis, Royal Dutch Shell was prepared. It had developed future scenarios, and in one 
scenario the oil prices spiked substantially. (Nordic West Office, Global Scenarios, 
2017.) This illustrates vividly how scenarios thinking can help institutions to prepare 
for the future shocks and surprises.  
 
As stated in the introduction, no one could have anticipated the crisis caused by 
COVID-19. Indeed, the magnitude of the havoc caused by a pandemic could not 
have been predicted. However, the possibility of a large-scale global downshift was 
predicted in Global Scenarios report by global affairs think tank Nordic West Office 
(see figure 1). In the process of developing the scenarios, the downshift option 
seemed the most unlikely one. It was even considered to drop out the fourth scenario 
altogether. How could we possibly end up in a world where everything is local, trade 
declines and globalization backlash occurs? The answer was that “an unpredictable 
global crisis results in zero growth (Nordic West Office, Global Scenarios, 2017.)”. 
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Figure 1 (Source: Nordic West Office, 2017) 
 
Besides business strategies, can scenario analysis be utilized in academic research? 
This thesis suggests that scenario methodology can be an extremely useful tool to 
provide novel academic insights and a way to connect theory and practice. As a 
matter of fact, the scenarios are all we have during uncertain times, such as a global 
pandemic. It seems that scenario-based analysis has surged in economics and media 
in the early 2020.  
 
The paper Scenarios as a scholarly methodology to produce “interesting research” 
examines three research studies that utilized scenarios as scholarly research 
methodology. (Ramirez et al., 2015.) The authors propose that scenario methodology 
can serve as innovative, yet scholarly and rigorous, way of producing “interesting 
research”. Their key finding is that scenario methodology enables us to question 
prevalent assumptions while developing new ways of inquiry. The method is 
particularly useful when dealing with multifaceted issues and uncertainty. Ramirez et 
al. argue that scenario research can co-exist, complement, and challenge the 
conventional qualitative and quantitative research methods.   
 
Dong-ho Han discusses using scenarios in the field of international relations and 
suggests that scenario thinking is a tool for producing new ideas, widening the scope 
of causal relationships subject to our inquiry, helping us to grasp the evolution of 
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global politics and the related elements of change. Han highlights how the scenario 
methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory and practice, as 
it helps us to understand the possible future paths and serves as an actual tool in 
policy making. (Han, 2011.) 
 
Han argues that there is a growing need in the field of IR for scenario analysis. First 
of all, the scenario method allows to combine diverse theoretical insights. This point 
is one of the main reasons for this thesis to utilize scenario method, as it facilitates 
and legitimizes the simultaneous use of contradictory theories. As we cannot neatly 
determine which theory of the euro’s problems is the great truth, it makes sense to 
compare these ideas in a coherent manner. 
 
While predicting the future is impossible, we can nevertheless anticipate the 
trajectories and trends leading to certain outcomes. Han suggests that scenario 
method could help overcome the problem of difficulty of prediction in social 
sciences. However, it is not asserted here that social sciences should aim at 
predicting the future or adopt positivist approach and methods of natural sciences. 
Quite the contrary, predicting in social sciences is essentially based on historical 
precedents and imagination, which is often downplayed in research. Because of the 
uncertain and unpredictable nature of the world politics, innovative way of thinking 
of plausible future outcomes is a powerful tool for exploring the future.    
 
Han refers to Janis Gross Stein and her colleagues’ input in understanding the future 
of Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a practical example of applying scenario 
methodology in IR. Gross Stein et al. construct five scenarios for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, including status-quo, negotiated agreement and Palestinian 
autonomy. The key variables in their analysis were domestic political sentiments and 
actions in Israel and Palestine, which they further analyzed in different scenario 
frameworks. (Janis Gross Stein, et al., 1998.) 
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3.2 The process and key concepts 
 
Ramirez et al. define scenarios as “small bespoke set of structured conceptual 
systems of equally plausible future contexts, often presented as narrative 
descriptions, manufactured for someone and for a purpose, typically to provide 
inputs for further work (Ramirez et al., 2015).” Han defines scenario method as “a 
means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, 
and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible and possible stories 
and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make 
an important decision at the present time (Han, 2011).” For Han, an important aspect 
of scenario-building exercise in IR is the value it can produce for policy making 
purposes.   
 
Han identifies five key concepts related to scenario methodology: driving forces, 
predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines 
(Han, 2011). This thesis utilizes Han’s definitions of these concepts. Driving forces 
are different combinations of causal factors that constitute the overarching narrative 
of each scenario. Predetermined elements are occasions that have already taken place 
or are almost certainly about to take place. In other words, these can be assumed as 
the certain elements that may cause other outcomes. Critical uncertainties are the 
critical elements of the scenario-building process, as identifying the unknown factors 
is the most important contribution of the scenario analysis. Wild cards are defined as 
extremely unlikely, yet possible, events that could radically alter the entire scenario 
plot line. Scenario plot lines refer directly to the overarching narratives of the 
scenarios, encompassing all the previously presented concepts and collecting them 
into comprehensive stories of the possible future eventualities, explaining how the 
events proceed from the current situation towards the assumed future. (Han, 2011.) 
 
According to Han, the process starts with identifying the problem, after which the 
driving forces are examined. This also includes separating “knowns” and 
“unknowns” and conceptualizing the critical uncertainties and wild cards (see figure 
2).  





This study uses scenario methodology because it is particularly suitable for 
examining uncertain contexts, which is exactly what the future of the euro is. 
Scenarios are not predictions, but plausible futures, that allow us to prepare for the 
potential risks and opportunities of the future. The scenario plotlines are built on 
existing research and analysis, that is further analyzed from the author’s perspective 
and developed into plausible scenarios for the future. Han’s concepts are utilized in 
the scenario-building process. 
 
3.3 Key axes: Economic and political integration 
 
Scenarios for the euro are built on two key variables. The first is economic 
integration versus economic disintegration, which forms the y-axis. The x-axis is 
based on juxtaposition of political integration and political disintegration (see figure 
3). Naturally, there is a variety of eventualities in between the extremes. The 
concepts of economic and political integration are not easily defined or reduced into 
two simple variables. It should be noted that the variables here are simplified 
versions of their complex empirical counterparts for analytical purposes.  
 




Political integration refers to continuing centralization of the political decision-
making power from national level towards the regional level. Political disintegration 
refers to relocating the political decision-making power and sovereignty to national 
governments. Economic integration entails deepening the economic co-operation 
and the power of related EMU institutions, whereas economic disintegration refers to 
declining economic co-operation and re-empowering the national governments, 
particularly in terms of monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
There is one important variable missing from the matrix: social integration (see 
figure 4). In fact, it is the pivotal factor in this analysis based on the literature review. 
Social integration variable is seen here as encompassing the issues of solidarity, 
legitimacy, and social cohesion. Low level of social integration is connected to anti-
EU sentiment, lack of solidarity and distrust towards the EU institutions from the 
citizens. High level of social integration means validation for the integration process 
from the citizens, enhanced transnational solidarity, and increasing trust towards the 
EU institutions. Social integration turns the eurozone into embedded currency area 
(see chapter 2).  
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It is suggested here that the political and economic integration variables are 
independent from social integration variable. The political process can indeed 
continue without support from the citizens, but the consequences depend on the the 
direction of social integration variable. Paradoxically, political disintegration and 
economic integration, accompanied with deepening social integration, may lead to 
better functioning common currency. Vice versa, deepening political integration and 
economic disintegration in connection to social disintegration may result in the 
opposite outcome. Thus, the social integration spectrum determines how the different 
combinations of economic and political integration turn out. 
 
There is one crucial point we must bear in mind when utilizing this axis. Economic 
and political integration do not automatically translate into economic growth and 
well-being. Vice versa, economic and political disintegration do not equal economic 
problems. As a matter of fact, disintegration may lead into better economic 
performance. This is an important note since disintegration is often associated with 
negative outcomes and considered as an undesirable development. However, the 
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4 Scenarios for the euro 
 
Based on the theoretical framework, this chapter aims at developing alternative 
future scenarios for the euro. For analytical purposes, the scope of the scenarios is 
restricted rather narrowly to the political economy of the EMU member states. It 
must be noted that there are countless variables beyond the political economy of the 
EMU that affect the future of the euro. For instance, both global financial crisis of 
2008 and corona crisis of 2020 originated from factors outside the EMU. For this 
reason, the scope of this scenario analysis is by no means all-encompassing or 
exhaustive. 
 
There are four extremes in the scenario matrix (see figure 5). The first scenario is 
based on the idea that the euro becomes a well-functioning common currency 
through European federalization. The second scenario is based on the idea that the 
euro crisis was just a bump in the road and increased national determination helps 
overcoming key problems. The third scenario envisions a continuation of ordoliberal 
and neoclassical resistance towards EMU reforms. The fourth scenario portrays the 
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Each scenario combines different varieties of political, economic, and social 
integration. In the first scenario, the EMU integrates economically, politically, and 
socially. Economic and political integration continue due to deepening social 
integration. In the second scenario, the EMU continues functioning without further 
political integration. The economic integration deepens as the political disintegration 
re-empowers the member states. The logic here is that the problems the EMU is 
facing can be resolved, and the problems are mainly seen deriving from the actors at 
the national level, not originating from the euro itself. This view emphasizes the 
importance of continuing economic integration, which does not necessarily require 
deeper political integration. The third scenario envisions artificially continuing 
European political integration, not supported by social integration, which escalates 
economic disintegration. The fourth scenario is the most dramatic vision for the 
future. Political and economic disintegration lead to EMU divorce. The narrative 
highlights systemic failures and design flaws of the EMU. It is not, however, a 
doomsday prediction. Europe can prosper without a common currency.  
 
How far in the future are the scenarios located? Structural changes do not occur over 
night – and yet we might wake up one day noticing we are in a crisis that no one saw 
coming. This scenario-building exercise is based on understanding long-term trends 
and changes, however, not excluding possibilities of perfect storms or black swans. 
Thus, the timeframe here is from five to ten years, which is not unthinkable future 
far away, but still serves as a realistic timeframe for long-term changes to occur.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the plot line of each scenario is presented. 
Then we move on to analyze key driving forces of the scenarios. Finally, critical 
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4.1 Scenario 1: Federal Europe  
 
“…An ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe…” -The Treaty of Rome 
 
Scenario plot line 
This scenario is mainly built on neo-Keynesian literature and euro-federalist 
ideology. The starting point is that any further integration requires transfers of 
sovereignty on fiscal, social, and political levels, and that the monetary union must 
be accompanied with a political union. (Castells, 2017; Patomäki, 2013.) This 
scenario is characterized by unprecedented level of regional regulation in the EU and 
EMU. Economic integration and political integration continue due to deepening 
social integration, which further enhances the legitimacy of the union. The EMU is 
an embedded currency area (ECA) (Matthijs and Blyth, 2015). In other words, the 
EMU is an optimal currency area, embedded in shared political and social 
frameworks, that enable it to respond in asymmetric shocks.  
 
The key defining features of this scenario are high levels of political, economic and 
social integration. This means that the whole eurozone structure has been reformed. 
The EU resembles a federal state, led by Germany and France. The monetary union, 
which previously did not work properly without a political union, is now a well-
functioning federal authority. The EMU has a federal budget for balancing surpluses 
and deficits within the union, and central bank funding is allowed. (Patomäki, 2013: 
128-9.) The EU adopts Modern Monetary Theory as a guiding principle. The nation 
states have transferred their sovereignty to the regional level to a great extent. The 
EMU members do enjoy currency sovereignty at the regional level. 
 
The ECB’s mandate is now extended to maintaining full employment, instead of 
solely controlling inflation. (Stiglitz, 2017: 240, 256.) The EMU has a strong 
banking union for common regulation, common deposit insurance and common 
resolution mechanisms. The eurozone has a common framework for stability. The 
EMU has established a solidarity fund for economically troubled countries, 
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automatic stabilizers for countries facing an economic downturn, credit flexibility, 
stronger regulation for the markets that create instability, and redesigned fiscal 
policies in an active counter-cyclical way. (Stiglitz, 2017: 243-44.) 
 
The Maastricht convergence criteria is reformed to be more fit for purpose. Instead 
of arbitrary ceilings for debt and deficits, a true convergence policy is promoted. 
Surpluses and deficits are balanced within the eurozone and excessive surpluses are 
discouraged and taxed if exceeding a certain limit. The revenues from the surplus tax 
are used to finance the solidarity fund for economically weaker countries. In 
addition, internal devaluation policies are discouraged. Germany and other surplus 
countries have shifted towards more expansionary fiscal policies and raised 
minimum wages. The weakest EMU member countries receive support to build high 
quality infrastructure. (Stiglitz, 2017: 252-56.) 
 
How did we end up here? As mentioned earlier, this scenario was achieved through 
deepening political and social integration. The COVID-19 crisis started a shift 
towards solidarity-based European social integration. The humanitarian catastrophe, 
caused by the pandemic, strengthened the solidarity within the EU. The EMU 
adopted MMT principles in order to rescue the damaged European economies. 
Ideological change started in Germany and France. A messy Brexit process helped to 
curb the anti-EU sentiment and strengthened the citizens’ support for the EU. 
Sustainability and climate change combating became real priorities, as worsening 
climate conditions forced the EU countries to deepen their co-operation.  
 
4.2 Scenario 2: A Bump in the Road  
 
“Paradoxically, greater national autonomy may encourage more integration.” -
Martin E. Sandbu 
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Scenario plot line 
This scenario combines neoclassical and neo-Keynesian ideas. The starting point is 
Rodrik’s political trilemma of democracy, national determination, and globalization. 
In the eurozone context, the trilemma is about the co-existence of democracy, 
national determination, and European integration. In this scenario, re-empowering 
national democracies leads to better European integration. The focus is shifted from 
maximum integration to pursuing better integration. 
 
The key driving force of this scenario is Sandbu’s argument that eurozone problems 
do not originate from the euro itself. The narrative here emphasizes the importance 
of the monetary union and how it should not be doomed as a gigantic historic 
mistake. Continuing economic integration does not necessarily require deepening 
political integration. Quite the opposite, rolling back the political integration 
enhances social integration, as the political power is relocated to the member states 
and the legitimacy of the union is improved. However, it is not continuation of the 
same with increased national self-determination. Structural reforms have been 
carried out both in the member states and in the EMU.  
 
In this scenario, economic integration continues, mostly in the form of gradual 
banking integration. Renationalizing policy making and re-empowering national 
governments has led to enhanced co-operation between the nation states. The EMU 
pursues smarter economic integration, not maximum economic integration. 
Legitimacy of the union is improved due to enhanced democracy in the member 
states. To state the obvious, there are numerous wild cards and critical uncertainties 
in this scenario plot line. Re-empowering national governments may backfire and 
lead to entirely opposite direction. These wild cards and critical uncertainties will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
 
In the big picture, a paradigm shift has occurred in terms of ideology and economic 
policy. Most importantly, the attitudes towards debt have changed, which paves the 
way to introducing debt restructuring programmes for heavily indebted countries. 
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Economic policymaking has been relocated to the national level, and the remaining 
regional economic policy is no longer based on TINA discourse. The responsibility 
of fixing the problems of the eurozone is transferred to the member states. These 
problems include balance-of-payment problems, controlling real economy problems, 
such as supporting employment and demand, and maintaining economic growth and 
productivity. National governments are prepared to prevent crises: e.g. unsustainable 
public and private debts are restructured when needed. The monetary union 
continues to function without a fiscal union. The aggregate demand is supported 
through efficient allocation of resources at the national level, which includes 
promoting full employment and investments. (Sandbu, 2017.) 
 
In this scenario, it is recognized that “one size fits for all” approach does not suit the 
eurozone. National varieties of fiscal policy are supported, and likeminded countries 
establish fiscal unions within the EMU. A single currency continues to increase 
predictability for businesses, facilitates trade and investments within the monetary 
union, and removes the devaluation tool, which incentivizes governments and 
companies to fix problems related to low productivity. (Sandbu, 2017.) 
 
How did we end up here? For this scenario to realize, abandoning the TINA 
discourse is the key. Germany and France should play a decisive role, while France 
being the most likely to start. The COVID-19 crisis of 2020 nearly devastated 
European economies, leaving no choice but to intervene in unsustainable public debt 
accumulation. The crisis also made visible how incapable the EU is to respond to a 
crisis such as this, and how the real power remains in the hands of national 
governments.  
 
4.3 Scenario 3: Show Must Go On 
 
“Creating the euro is the second-worst monetary idea its members are ever likely to 
have. Breaking it up is the worst.” -Martin Wolf 
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Scenario plot line 
In this scenario, the driving forces are neoclassical and ordoliberal theories. The 
starting point, again, is the notion that any further integration requires transfers of 
sovereignty on fiscal, social, and political levels. However, the result is the opposite 
of Federal Europe. European political project continues, accompanied with social 
disintegration, leading chaotically to economic disintegration. This scenario is 
characterized by continuing “forced integration”, which means that the integration 
process is not based on a social market economy model which is supported by most 
of the European citizens. (Castells, 2017: 35-40.) In the literature and media this 
scenario is often referred as muddling through. It means continuation of the status 
quo: no significant changes or reforms take place. Due to forced political integration, 
in the absence of social integration, the result is growing fragmentation and 
polarization between the Northern and Southern member states.  
 
The demands for greater political integration continue to be based on TINA 
discourse. Europe is trapped in a failing monetary union, and there is no alternative 
other than almost an apocalypse. (Sandbu, 2017.) TINA discourse is based on the 
belief that the problems of the EMU are consequences of individual countries’ 
reckless finances and fiscal failures. (Stiglitz, 2017.) There is a widespread belief 
that the destiny of the monetary union and the European Union are tied together, and 
one cannot exist without another.  
 
In fact, TINA discourse is the driving ideological force of this scenario, causing a 
political gridlock that paralyzes the decision-makers and prevents them of doing any 
decisive moves towards meaningful reforms. This gridlock is further exacerbated by 
mutual scapegoating that dominates the ever more fragmented European political 
landscape. Political divisions have deepened, and European cooperation has been 
displaced by nationalist interests. Populism, protectionism, and paralysis are the 
driving forces here. The expansion of populism has been further enhanced by 
politicians themselves, as they keep blaming the EU for failures, while taking the 
credit when succeeding. (Fratzher, 2018: 167.) 
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The divisions between the Northern and Southern members of the EMU escalate. 
Southern member states accuse Northern member states of lack of solidarity. 
Northern members, especially Germany, are considered as being egoistic and self-
interested, pursuing their own national benefit at the expense of the other Europeans. 
Germany continues to be the most vocal proponent of austerity policies, while being 
held responsible of the EMU’s economic and financial imbalances. Germany and 
other Northern EMU countries insist that it is the unsustainable fiscal and social 
policies of others that have caused the instability. Northern countries implemented 
hard reforms in order to restore their global competitiveness, and the other countries 
should follow their example. It is unjust that German taxpayers will have to pay for 
the mistakes of lazy Greeks laying under the olive trees. (Fratzcher, 2018: 133-4.) 
 
The main practical reason why the EMU is still up and running in this scenario is 
due to the fact that the doomsday predictions by several commentators since the 
financial crisis of 2008 have still not realized. Against all odds, the eurozone has 
continued muddling through for almost ten years. At one point, it seemed extremely 
likely that Greece would have to leave the monetary union. Nevertheless, no country 
has left the union, and the political will to preserve the EMU has remained strong, 
even if it means poor economic performance and social predicament in the member 
states.  
 
How did we end up here? The combination of neo-classical and ordoliberal 
economic doctrine continue to dominate the EMU decision-making. No significant 
reforms to the eurozone structure take place. This scenario is continuation of status 
quo, which exacerbates the prevailing disputes and frictions within the EMU. The 
whole EU failed in terms of responding to the corona crisis of 2020. The member 
states did not manage to deliver a coordinated approach to the crisis, and the 
economic downturn was severe.  
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4.4 Scenario 4: Existential Failure 
 
“The euro can and should be saved – but not at any cost.” -Joseph E. Stiglitz 
 
Scenario plot line 
This scenario is mostly based on neo-Keynesian arguments. In this scenario, it turns 
out that the euro was indeed a gigantic historic mistake and a growing political 
fragmentation results in a dissolution of the monetary union. This scenario is the 
ultimate existential failure, as the eurozone is dissolved into new national and 
regional currency areas. However, it is not necessarily an existential failure in terms 
of economic and political success of the countries. Acknowledging that the euro was 
not a good idea after all does not necessarily translate into an apocalypse. Existential 
Failure scenario combines both political and economic disintegration variables. The 
starting point is Rodrik’s political trilemma of incompatible democracy, national 
determination, and globalization, applied to the European context. European hyper-
integration had to be sacrificed for democracy and national determination. 
 
The eurozone divorce is carried out in an amicable manner, without excessive costs. 
A set of institutional reforms smoothened the transition. In this scenario, Italy is the 
first one leaving the bloc. The new financial system is created, along with the lines 
of Stiglitz’s proposal of 21st century financial transactions system. The system is 
based on electronic money. Italy creates Italian euro, which serves as the currency 
within the Italian banking system.  
 
After leaving the euro, Italy has monetary policy sovereignty again, and thus ability 
to create credit without a fear of a default. Moreover, the new financial system is 
accompanied with 21st-century banking system, allowing the states to overcome 
problems caused by private banks’ power to create credit. In the framework of 21st-
century banking system, governments can start heavily regulating the credit creation 
process and direct the credit towards productive investments, rather than 
accumulating private profits. (Stiglitz, 2017: 279-84.) 
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Furthermore, the more stable countries in the euro area create regional currencies. 
Countries such as Germany, Netherlands and Finland create Northern Euro (neuro). 
The countries joining the neuro are similar enough in terms of their economies, 
which decreases the likelihood of asymmetric shocks. This time, the mistakes of the 
previous common currency experiment can be avoided. The Northern European 
Central Bank (NECB) is allowed to fund its member states and there are no 
arbitrarily determined debt and deficit ceilings. The NECB mandate is primarily 
focused on maintaining full employment. 
 
The Europe continues to be divided both politically and economically. A critical 
uncertainty here is the future of the European Union. We must keep in mind that the 
dissolution of the EMU does not inevitably correlate with the dissolution of the EU. 
The EU can continue to exist and facilitate the co-operation between the nation 
states. It is difficult to imagine a future where the EU was dismissed altogether. 
However, it is a crucial aspect of the scenario-building exercise to take into account 
those extremely unlikely, yet possible, developments. If the EMU divorce becomes 
ugly, EU break-up might be an option. Thus, the dissolution of the EU is considered 
as a wild card of this scenario, while amicable or chaotic divorce of the EMU being 
the critical uncertainty. These variables are clarified in the following subsections. 
 
How did we end up here? The COVID-19 pandemic was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back, escalating tensions between the Northern and Southern member states. 
Nationalist forces downplayed the demands for European integration driven by 
political elite. The Southern member states were forced to search for alternatives as 
the damage for their economies became to heavy to handle. Brexit was a success, 
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4.5 Driving forces 
 
Driving forces are different combinations of causal factors that constitute the 
overarching narrative of each scenario. The key driving forces of each scenario are 
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4.6 Predetermined elements 
 
Predetermined elements are occasions that have already taken place or are almost 
certainly about to take place. In this analysis, the predetermined elements are 
portrayed as megatrends that are likely to prevail in each scenario. However, these 
known elements may cause quite different outcomes in different frameworks. 
 
The most critical predetermined element in each scenario is prolonged economic 
downturn caused by COVID-19 crisis. As noted earlier, this element is likely to play 
out differently, depending on the given driving forces. In fact, the response to the 
COVID-19 crisis is key determinant on where we are heading in terms of the 
scenario matrix. The crisis can turn out to become a trigger for a large-scale 
paradigm shift in terms of economic policies or it can become a source of growing 
fragmentation and disintegration. Figure 8 illustrates how the COVID-19 crisis as a 
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4.7 Critical uncertainties 
 
Critical uncertainties are the critical elements of the scenario-building process, since 
identifying the unknown factors is one of the most important contributions of 
scenario analysis. Figure 9 presents the critical uncertainties of the four scenarios. In 
this analysis, these uncertainties are above all criticism of the logic of the scenarios.  
 
First of all, it is rather uncertain how genuine social integration can be achieved in 
Federal Europe, given the fragmented political reality in Europe. Meanwhile, A 
Bump in the Road scenario assumes that re-empowering national governments 
would lead to better economic policies, but this could backfire in countless ways. For 
instance, it is uncertain whether the national governments will choose to pursue 
economic integration or even democracy. Show Must Go On scenario is based on 
continuing uncertainty, but for how long can the status quo be preserved? Finally, in 
Existential Failure scenario the EMU divorce is assumed to be amicable. However, 
divorces are seldom amicable, but rather ugly. If the divorce is chaotic, the logic of 
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4.8 Wild cards 
 
Wild cards are defined as extremely unlikely, yet possible, events that could 
radically alter the entire scenario plot line. These events are exactly the kind of black 
swans that can throw us from one scenario into another. Figure 10 presents the wild 
cards of each scenario.  
 
Regarding Federal Europe, if an unpredictable event causes tremendous decline in 
the level of output and production capacity in Europe, the MMT conditions do not 
apply anymore. This could throw us in Show Must Go On or Existential Failure 
world. Same applies to A Bump in the Road scenario: ever growing political 
disintegration and rising nationalism might lead to Show Must Go On or Existential 
Failure. In regards of Show Must Go On, the real wild card would be a gradual 
emergence of social integration in Europe, which could lead us Federal Europe. Vice 
versa, if social integration continues declining, we might be headed to Existential 
Failure. This is not, however, considered as a wild card as declining social 
integration does not seem extremely unlikely. Finally, the logic of Existential Failure 
could be reversed if the political integration in Europe truly escalates to the point in 
which the whole EU is dissolved. It would not necessarily throw us in any other 
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5 Conclusions  
 
This thesis argues that scenario analysis is a fruitful method to conceptualize 
uncertain future and potential shocks and turbulences it may hold. The paper 
demonstrated that there are conditions in which the euro can survive and even 
prosper. On the other hand, there are conditions in which the euro may be doomed to 
fail due to its design flaws and lack of social integration within the eurozone. 
Utilizing scenario method, chapter 4 presented four plausible futures for the euro.  
 
The scenario-building exercise demonstrates how the different theories and views on 
how the EMU should be governed and reformed may play out in practice. Each 
scenario reflects certain school of thought that entails specific elements of reform 
and governing principles. Scenario Federal Europe is based on neo-Keynesian and 
euro-federalists accounts, whereas A Bump in the Road scenario combines 
neoclassical and neo-Keynesian theories. Scenario Show Must Go On is based on 
neoclassical and ordoliberal theories, while Existential Failure scenario builds on 
neo-Keynesian arguments. 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis was that the future of the euro is extremely uncertain 
without significant social and fiscal reforms. The hypothesis is not supported by 
ordoliberal theory, which insist that the eurozone problems can be fixed through 
fiscal discipline. From neo-Keynesian and euro-federalist perspective, this premise 
seems to be correct. Interestingly, neoclassical economists seem to be divided 
regarding this question and it seems that a paradigm shift may be occurring among 
several mainstream economists in terms of certain social and fiscal reforms. The 
hypothesis is also supported by the evidence of growing North-South divide within 
the EMU, as the question of solidarity has become a central element of this debate. 
 
Thus, the key conclusion is that for the euro to survive, social integration must 
deepen. In other words, any meaningful social or fiscal reform in the eurozone 
structure requires increased solidarity within the union. It cannot be concluded that 
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there would be a consensus among different schools of thought regarding social 
integration. However, this thesis argues that the future of the euro is extremely 
uncertain without increased social integration and solidarity within the eurozone.  
 
Regarding the reforms, there is a growing consensus between different schools of 
thought (except ordoliberal) that the most important structural reform would be some 
level of debt mutualization and restructuring. Another important reform would be 
increased banking integration, which would enhance financial stability in the 
eurozone through common standards and harmonize the banking regulation between 
the member states. Debt restructurings and banking union would require deepening 
solidarity in the EMU, so they cannot be expected to fully realize before social 
integration moves forward.  
 
The scenarios in which the EMU prospers (Federal Europe and A Bump in the Road) 
include aspects of social integration and banking integration. Vice versa, the 
scenarios in which the EMU cannot survive (Show Must Go On and Existential 
Failure) include lack of social integration and banking integration. There are, 
however, divided views on the interplay between political and economic integration. 
Federal Europe scenario combines ideas based on the argument that any further 
integration requires additional transfers of sovereignty at social, political, and fiscal 
levels. Quite the contrary, A Bump in the Road scenario assumes that re-empowering 
the nation states might in fact lead to better economic integration. Meanwhile, Show 
Must Go On scenario starts from the same assumption as Federal Europe regarding 
any further integration requiring additional transfers of sovereignty from nation 
states to European level. In the absence of social integration, artificially continuing 
political integration results in economic disintegration. Existential Failure scenario 
sacrifices both economic and political integration, as it turns out that achieving social 
integration is a mission impossible in the EMU.  
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Federal Europe. In this scenario, the EMU integrates economically, politically, and 
socially. The main driver is deepening social integration, which allows social and 
fiscal reforms in the EU and EMU to emerge.  
 
A Bump in the Road. In the second scenario, the EMU continues functioning 
without further political integration. The economic integration deepens as the 
political disintegration re-empowers the member states. The logic here is that the 
problems the EMU is facing can be resolved, and the problems are mainly seen 
deriving from the actors at the national level, not originating from the euro itself. 
This view emphasizes the importance of continuing economic integration, which 
does not necessarily require deeper political integration.  
 
Show Must Go On. The third scenario envisions artificially continuing European 
political integration, not supported by social integration, which results in economic 
disintegration. The main driver here is “there is no alternative” discourse, which 
entails neo-classical and ordoliberal approach to economic policies. No significant 
reforms to the EMU structure take place and thus the eurozone continues muddling 
through. 
 
Existential Failure. The fourth scenario is the most dramatic vision for the future of 
the euro. So dramatic that many commentators do not want to see it as an option. In 
this scenario, political and economic disintegration lead to EMU divorce. This 
narrative highlights the systemic failures and design flaws that turn out to be 
unresolvable. It is not, however, a doomsday prediction. In this scenario, Europe can 
prosper without a common currency.  
 
At this point, a relevant question arises: which scenario is likely to prevail? An 
objective likelihood assessment is naturally beyond the scope of this thesis, and quite 
frankly beyond the scope of any research. Again, it is not the purpose of scenario 
analysis. However, we can always propose subjective assessments on where are we 
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heading. Here is my educated guess, based on the above-mentioned main drivers for 
a prospering EMU and for a disintegrating EMU. 
 
The likelihood of social integration to accelerate in Europe seems low in the current 
atmosphere. Unfortunately, it is something we cannot force. Social integration in 
Europe would require genuine sense of a common European identity, quite similarly 
as the nation states and national identities emerged. Much depends on the most 
powerful actors, such as Germany and France, who do not show any intention to take 
steps towards socially integrated Europe. Thus, it seems that Show Must Go On is 
the most likely scenario we are facing in the immediate future. The EMU continues 
to muddle through until it faces the wall. After hitting the wall, an ugly divorce 
might not be avoided. The second likely scenarios for the EMU would be A Bump in 
the Road or Existential Failure. These both would require tremendous structural 
reforms and ideological reorientations. The most unlikely scenario is Federal Europe. 
It is simply something no one in Europe desires, even if it would probably be the 
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